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STUDENT NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAWS: WHAT IS THE BASIS OF JURISDICTION
TO DETERMINE WHICH PARENT SHALL HAVE THE
CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN FOLLOWING
DIVORCE?
Determining which parent shall have the custody of minor children Is one of the more difficult problems incident to the process of
divorce. A court is faced not only with the repercussions caused by
the severing of the domestic relation, but, when petitioned, must
provide for the future relation between the child and each parent.
In order to make such a determination a court must have jurisdiction
to act on the matter. The question most frequently arises from the
standpoint of Conflict of Laws in two ways: First, does the court
which grants a divorce also have jurisdiction to make an award of
custody which will be given extraterritorial effect? Second, does the
court of the forum have jurisdiction to alter a decree of custody
previously given in another state? It is our purpose to point out the
basis of jurisdiction in both instances.
Two bases for jurisdiction to award the custody of minor children upon divorce are to be found in the authorities: Jurisdiction is
1
based on the domicile of the child. Jurisdiction is based on the wel2
fare of the child.
I.
The theory upon which the child's domicile is designated as the
proper place for awarding custody is that custody, as a domestic relation, Is a status. Questions of status are within the control of the
3
domicile of the person concerned. As Professor Goodrich puts it:
"Matters of status, that is the more or less permanent relations of an individual with other persons which are terminable
by law, not merely by his consent are determined as a general rule
by the law of the individual's domicile. This rule in Conflict of
Laws is based on the proposition that it is the state of his domicile
which Is most concerned in his personal, as distinguished from his
business relations. So it is the law of his domicile and only that
law grants him a divorce. Jurisdiction for legitimation and adoption of children likewise depends on domioile.
It would seem, though it is not an open and shut proposition,
that the award of the custody of children in a divorce suit is an
adjudication affecting status and so properly made only where the
child is domiciled, and where the parent to whom the child is
awarded is domiciled . .. "
1 Vilner v. Gatlin, 143 Ga. 816, 85 N.E. 1045, 1046 (1915); Griffin v.
Griffin, 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598, 604 (1898); Lanning v. Gregory, 100
Tex. 310, 99 S.W. 542, 544 (1907); In Re Groves, 109 Was. 112, 186 Pac.
300, 301 (1919); II. Beale, The Conflict of Laws, (1935) sec. 144.3.
3In Re Bort, 25 Kan. 215, 216 (1881); Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn.
211, 201 S.W. 779, 782 (1917); Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W.Va. 124, 81
S.E. 706, 707 (1914); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws, (1937)
p. 299.
$Herbert F. Goodrich, Custody of Childrenin Divorce Suits, (1921)
7 Corn. L.Q. 1, 2-3.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNA,
The courts have applied the test of domicile to both situations
pointed out supra. If the parent seeking the divorce and the child are
domiciled in the state and are before the court, it is generally held that
a court with power to act on the subject matter may award custody of
the child, and that such award is entitled to full faith and credit under
the Federal Constitution subject to the following limitation.' An
award of custody by its nature is not conclusive. Upon a change of
conditions the court making the original award may modify it or make
a new one. Thus, acting upon this basis the courts of another state
may so modify upon a change of conditions, if they have jurisdiction.
Most courts are of the opinion that where the child is not domiciled
in the state the state generally does not have jurisdiction.5 Griffin v.
Griffi7O illustrates one manner in which such a decree may be given.
There, a California mother, upon a decree of divorce, had been
awarded custody of the children, and had been forbidden to remove
them from the county without permission. She secured permission to
take them to Oregon, on condition that she bring back at a certain
time. Instead of returning she acquired a domicile in Oregon. As a
result of her action the California court modified its decree and
awarded custody to the father, who brought habeas corpus in Oregon
to obtain the children. The court denied the petition upon two
grounds; first, that the best interest of the children demanded that they
stay with the mother; second, that at the time of the last California
decree the children were domiciled in Oregon and the California court
no longer had jurisdiction over the status. The decision adopts the
position that domicile confers jurisdiction and that the domicile of the
7
parent to whom custody is given controls the domicile of the child.
The courts which adhere strictly to the basis of domicle will not entertain an action to alter a custody award previously given in another
state even though there is a possibility that conditions may have
4Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho 512, 269 Pac. 987, 988 (1928);
... In most instances the parents, or at least one of them and the
children, were before the court making the decree. In this class of
cases, some few courts have refused to be bound by - foregn decree...
The rule that may be denominated the majority rule recognizes the
conclusiveness of the foreign decree and holds that it may be enforced
extraterritorially provided no change has taken place in the circumstances."
5People ex. rel. Wagner, 94 Colo. 47, 27 Pac. (2d) 1038 (1933); Re
Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (1911); Lanning v. Gregory, 100
Tex. 310, 99 S.W. 542 (1907); Beale, op. cit. supra, note 1.
6 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598 (1920).
7 Although at the common law the minor child's domicile followed
the domicile of the father, it is now said that the domicile of the child
is the domicile of the parent legally entitled to its custody; Toledo
Traction Co. v. Cammeron, (C.C.A. 6th Cir.) 127 Fed. 48 (1905); Fox
v. Hicks, 81 Minn. 197, 83 N.W. 538 (1900); Beale, The Progress of the
Law, (1919) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 50, 58; The Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, (1934) Sec. 32.
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changed. They say that only the state of domicile has jurisdiction
over the status involved.8
II.
In an effort to circumvent the technical difficulties presented by
the test of domicile some courts have modified a foreign decree where
the child is present within the state without determining the child's
domicile.' The theory is based in the conception that the state is the
parens partriae of any child resident within its borders. Thus the
courts of the state acquire jurisdiction to regulate the custody of such
Infants because the prime consideration is the welfare and best
interests of the child.
In Re Bort'0 is the leading case in support of the doctrine of welfare of the child. In this case the father obtained a divorce in Wisconsin where he was awarded custody of the children, whom the
mother then abducted to Kansas. The father sought to enforce the
Wisconsin decree in the latter state. The Kansas court took the
position that a decree of custody is based upon local concern and that
the welfare of the child is paramount. It is important to note that
the cases in this group involve jurisdiction to alter a custody decree
previously given in another state. Whether they put their decision on
changed conditions is immaterial unless it appears from the facts
that the child is domiciled within the state.
The comparatively recent case of State ex rel. Larson v. Larson"
presents the situation where the test of welfare would be applied. The
state of Iowa awarded custody to the farmer for six months and to the
mother for the remaining six months of the year. The mother moved
to Minnesota and refused to let the child return to the father upon the
expiration of her period of custody. The Minnesota court denied the
father a writ of habeas corpus, refusing to recognize the Iowa decree
on the ground that the welfare and interest of the child demanded that
the mother be given custody, and that the domicile of the child was
still In Minnesota although the mother's period of custody had
expired. In regard to the latter ground it is submitted that the court
assumed the question it was asked to decide. Strictly, the domicile of
the child passed instantly to the state of the parent entitled to custody
upon expiration of the six month period" and did not depend upon a
8 Glass v. Glass, 260 Mass. 562, 157 N.E. 621 (1927); Lanning v.
Gregory, 100 Tex. 310, 99 S.W. 542 (1907); Mokchka v. Rollands, 144
Wash. 565, 258 Pac. 333 (1927).
' Mylius v. Cargil, 19 N.M. 278, 142 Pac. 918 (1914) ; Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925); Stapler v. Leamon, 101 W. Va.
235, 132 S.E. 507 (1926); see Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac. 606
(1930).
1125 Kan. 215 (1881).
n190 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329 (1934); Commented on: (1934) 18
Minn. L. Rev. 591.
"See note 7 supra.
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physical removal from the state. This placed the domicile of the child
back in Iowa with the father before the Minnesota court had an opportunity to deny recognition to the Iowa decree. Therefore, there
remains nothing upon which to predicate the jurisdiction exercised by
Minnesota except the welfare of the child coupled with its residence
within the state.
There are arguments in favor of and arguments against each of
the bases discussed. In regard to welfare no one will contend that the
best interest of the child should not be paramount in determining
custody, but whether it can be the only jurisdictional fact Is a different
matter. It Is an all-inclusive term which will enable a court to deal
rather arbitrarily with the society, services, and control of education
to which a parent is entitled by virtue of the parent-child relation.
Custody of a child Is not a one-sided affair but involves Interests of the
parent as well as those of the child. The welfare of the child has its
place in the making of the actual award Itself, as distinguished from
jurisdiction to make the award.
On the other hand concerning domicile, there Is a temptation when
dealing with the concept of status, to treat it as something resembling
a res and then to localize it in a particular state to the detriment of
the child. But a status Is an intangible thing composed of a group of
legal relations rather than a single res and cannot be given a permanent
situs.1 1
In rationalizing the two bases given one must choose at least three
principles from the situations presented. First, the paramount factor
in determining who shall have the custody of a minor child following divorce is the welfare and best interests of the child. Second, the
state of domicile of the child is interested in more of the sum total
of relations making up the status of custody than any other state.
Third, the state of the forum may be in a position where, for the actual
welfare of the child, it desires to alter a decree previously given in another state although the child is not domiciled within its boundaries.
It cannot do so if the test of domicile is applied strictly.
The practical aspects of the problem suggest that the domicile of
the child is the fundamental basis of jurisdiction to make an original
award of custody which will have extraterritorial effect. This does
not lessen the extent to which the welfare of the child is to be considered. It is equally fundamental that the basis for jurisdiction at
the forum to alter an award of custody previously given in another
state may be the welfare of the child coupled with its residence there.
This is essentially the position taken by the Restatement.'
It Is
21Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 4, at 298.
1 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 146; "Upon the legal separation of the parents, by divorce or otherwise, custody of their child can
be given to either parent by a court of the state of domicile of the
child." Comment (c): " A court granting a divorce or legal separation of the parents cannot award to either the custody of a child unless
the child is domiciled in the state, although if the child is physically
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Interesting to note, however, that the Resatement would not give
extraterritorial effect to a decree of the forum when jurisdiction Is
based on welfare of the child." But the efficacy of such a provision is
questionable when read in connection with section 32. The relevant
,part of this section reads: "The minor child's domicile, in the case of
divorce or judicial separation of its parents is that of the parent to
whose custody it has been legally given.. ."16 If the forum can make
a binding award within its borders upon jurisdiction based on welfare, does the child's domicile not become that of the parent to whom
it Is given? If it does, the forum Is immediately the state of domicile
and its award should be given extraterritorial effect.
CoNcLusIoN
It Is submitted that there Is not one basis for jurisdiction to
determine which parent shall have the custody of minor children
following divorce, but two. The domicile of the child Is the basis for
Jurisdiction to make an original award of custody, while the welfare
of the child, coupled with Its residence, may be the basis for jurisdic7
tion at the forum to alter a decree previously given in another state.'
The following situations illustrate the result of the foregoing
analysis.
Husband, Wife and Child are domiciled in state X. State X
(1)
grants W a divorce. State X has jurisdiction to award the custody
of C.13
Husband, Wife and Child are domiciled in state X. H
(2)
(a)
goes to state Y and sues for a divorce, W being at fault. State Y has
present in the state at the time, the temporary custody of the child
may be given." Sec. 148 Reads: "In any state into which the child
comes, upon proof that the custodian of the child is unfit to have control of the child, the child may be taken from him and given while
In the state to another person."
5 Comment (a) to See. 148: This action will be effective within the
state. If the state is also the domicile of the child, the action will
change the status and will therefore be effective in every state."
16
Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 32, op. cit. Supra
note 9.
'T Although the conclusion reached here follows Beale and Goodrich In the essential fundamental, domicile, it recognizes a situation
where the doctrine of welfare as advocated by Stumberg is the only
means by which a desirable result can be reached, i.e., where the forum
has the child within its boundaries as a resident but not as a domiciliary. As pointed out, the Restatement recognizes such a situation
but limits the solution which it offers by denying extraterritorial effect
to the forum's award. It is believed that the solution of the whole
problem necessitates a combining of doctrines as has been attempted
in this conclusion.
28Stumberg is of the opinion that there can be little doubt that a
court has jurisdiction when all the parties concerned are domicilaries
of the state where the divorce is sought. Stumberg, op. cit. supra note
2 at 298.
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jurisdiction to grant H a divorceP' and also has jurisdiction to award
the custody of C.0
(b) Husband, Wife and Child are domiciled in state X. W goes
to state Y and sues for a divorce, H being at fault. H does not appear.
State Y does not have jurisdiction to award the custody of C.
(3) Husband, Wife and Child are domiciled in state X. H (or W)
obtains a divorce and C is awarded to his (or her) custody. The party
not entitled to custody abducts C and flees to state Y, establishing residence. The party entitled to custody brings habeas corpus for possession of C in state Y. State Y has jurisdiction to alter the award previously given upon a showing of changed conditions."
W. L. M.&Trws, J.
PROCESS SERVICE ON RESIDENT AGENT OF NON-RESIDENT.
IS SEC. 51-6 OF THE KENTUCKY CIVIL CODE
CONSTITUTIONAL?
The Kentucky Court of Appeals referred in a recent decisionl to a
prior case which declared that see. 51-6 of the Civil Code providing for
substituted service upon the agent of a nonresident individual or
partnership doing business within the state in actions against the
The judicial treatment of that
nonresident was unconstitutional.
section is very interesting, since both the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Kentucky Court of Appeals have changed their
"Elwood Rosenbaum, ExtraterritorialValidity of Ex Parte Divorces, (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 247, 249.
"Lanning v. Gregory, 100 Tex. 310, 99 S.W. 542, 544 (1907) states
that the state which is the domicile of the child and the domicile of the
father is the state entitled to award custody. Although the illustration used is composed of somewhat different facts, it is readily seen
that the domicile of the child follows the domicile of the father until
it has been legally given to the other parent; therefore it is in state Y.
2'No case has been found involving this particular point, but by
analogy to the cases cited it would seem that C's domicile remained
in state X with the father until the mother was entitled legally to its
custody. There had been no previous award of custody; therefore the
wife must seek her divorce at the domicile of the child if the court
awarding the divorce is to have jurisdiction to award the child.
2Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1917); The
significant factor in this situation is that there has been a previous
decree in another state and the jurisdiction taken goes only to altering
such a decree.
'-Jones v. Fuller, 280 Ky. 671, 134 S.W. (2d) 240 (1939).
2
Andrews Bros. v. McClanahan, 220 Ky. 504, 295 S.W. 457 (1927).
3Ky. Civic Code (Carroll's 1938) sec. 51-6. "In actions against an
individual residing in another state, or a partnership, association, or
joint stock company, the members of which reside in another state,
engaged in business in this State, the summons may be served on the
manager, or agent of, or person in charge of, such business in this
State, in the county where the business is carried on, or in the county
where the cause of action accrued."

